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Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Peace
David Little* 1
I. INTRODUCTION
It was the solemn intention and expectation of the drafters of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of all the subsequent
instruments that the promotion and protection of human rights,
including the right to religious freedom, would advance the cause of
peace. 2 However, this thesis faces strong opposition as of late. There
are a number of scholars who, in the spirit of Michel Foucault, regard
human rights as a “a discourse of pseudo-emancipation that serves to
conceal [various] entanglement[s] with ‘power.’” 3
Three books, two recently published, apply this criticism to the
subject of religious freedom. The two most recent are Beyond
Religious Freedom by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, 4 and Politics of
Religious Freedom edited by Hurd, Saba Mahmoud, Peter Danchin,
and Winnifred Sullivan. 5 The third, The Impossibility of Religious
Freedom, is an older book by Sullivan. 6 These four authors are
associated with an influential blog called the “Immanent Frame” that
is dedicated to “problematizing”—in a favorite word—liberal rights
discourse. 7 Two other skeptics who approach the subject from a
slightly different angle, but come to similar conclusions, are Marci

*Research Fellow at the Berkley Center of Religion, Peace, and International Affairs,
Georgetown University, and retired Professor of the Practice in Religion, Ethnicity, and
International Conflict at Harvard Divinity School.
2. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble (Dec.
10, 1948); G.A. Res. 35/55, Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, preamble (Nov. 25, 1981).
3. RICHARD WOLIN, THE SEDUCTION OF UNREASON: THE INTELLECTUAL ROMANCE
WITH FASCISM FROM NIETZSCHE TO POSTMODERNISM 22 (2004).
4. ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL
POLITICS OF RELIGION (2015).
5. POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2015).
6. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2005).
7. THE IMMANENT FRAME: SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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Hamilton in God vs. the Gavel, 8 and Brian Leiter in Why
Tolerate Religion? 9
Other studies, such as Formations of the Secular by Talal Asad 10—
mentor of the “Immanent Frame” group—or A Post-Liberal Peace by
Oliver Richmond, 11 represent related challenges to various efforts
aimed at promoting peace around the world by institutionalizing
human rights along with democracy and the rule of law. Some of these
attacks against the connection between human rights and peace are
part of a larger anti-human rights campaign that appears to be
gathering momentum. One thinks of Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia:
Human Rights in History, 12 along with his latest work, Christian
Human Rights, published just last year, 13 as well as Eric Posner’s
Twilight of Human Rights Law. 14
After providing some general comments about human rights,
religious freedom, and peace, I shall deal with four of these critics,
Asad, Richmond, Sullivan, and Hurd. They raise objections about the
legitimacy and supposed benefits of human rights standards that need
to be considered. 15 My defense, in a word, is that whatever problems
there are lie not with the standards themselves, but with the way they
are used.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND PEACE
The opening lines of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) say this: “[R]ecognition of the inherent

8. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF
LAW (2005).
9. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013). See also DAVID LITTLE, ESSAYS
ON RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO STAND ON 143–69 (2015) for a critique of
SULLIVAN, supra note 6 and HAMILTON, supra note 8.
10. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM,
MODERNITY (2003).
11. OLIVER P. RICHMOND, A POST-LIBERAL PEACE (2011).
12. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). For a
critique of Moyn’s book, see DAVID LITTLE, Critical Reflections on The Last Utopia: Human
Rights in History by Samuel Moyn, in ESSAYS IN RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO
STAND ON (2015).
13. SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS (2015).
14. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
15. Incidentally, I shall be examining at greater length much of this recent literature in a
survey review for the fall issue of Law and Religion.
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dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the
world.” 16 The Preamble to the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief says something similar:
[T]he disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or
indirectly, wars and great suffering to [human]kind. . . . [The]
freedom of religion and belief should . . . contribute to the
attainment of the goals of world peace, social justice, and friendship
among peoples . . . . 17

The references to peace are not incidental. Human rights in
general and the right to conscience, religion, or belief in particular
were explicitly designed as a set of legally enforceable rights and
protections capable of preventing the reappearance of autocratic
government and the exercise of arbitrary force associated with Hitler
and his fascist allies that were in large part responsible for the “wars
and great suffering” of the mid-twentieth century. 18
Speaking of autocratic government and the arbitrary exercise of
force, we should recall that Hitler rose to power on the strength of
Article 48—the emergency article—of the Weimar Constitution. 19 It

16. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 2.
17. G.A. Res. 35/55, supra note 2.
18. Id.
19. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution states:
If a state does not fulfill its responsibilities under the federal constitution or federal
laws, the Reich President can compel it to do so with the help of armed force.
If the public security and order of the Reich are significantly disrupted or endangered,
the Reich President can take all measures needed for the restoration of public security
and order, if necessary with the help of armed force. To this end he may temporarily
suspend the fundamental rights granted in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124
and 153.
The Reich President must immediately notify the Reichstag of all measures adopted
under Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this article. These measures must be rescinded
if the Reichstag demands it.
DIE DERFALLUNG DES DEUITCHEN REICHS [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 48
(Ger.), translated in http://home.wlu.edu/~patchw/His_214/_handouts/Weimar%20
constitution.htm. These suspendable articles prohibit imprisonment without due process, the
search of homes without a warrant, and the opening of letters or tapping of telephone lines, and
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permitted the suspension of civil rights “with almost no limit,”20
including extensive censorship, widespread searches and seizures,
secret and unlimited detentions, and the establishment of irregular
tribunals to prosecute individuals suspected of threatening national
security—in effect, authorizing Hitler to use police power to
intimidate and suppress all opposition. 21
We could almost say that the whole human rights corpus (not to
mention the corpus of humanitarian law) was a response to Hitler and
other fascists’ massive abuse of an appeal to public emergency. For
example, Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), which imposes both stringent conditions of
notification and authorization on states claiming a threat of public
emergency and a set of nonderogable rights (rights that may not be
suspended under any conditions). 22 That set of rights prohibits
discrimination, even during times of emergency; extrajudicial killing;
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
enslavement; and denials of due process and the freedom of
conscience, religion, or belief. 23 Both the conditions and the rights
were systematically violated by the Hitler regime prior to and during
World War II. 24 In addition, the Hitler experience reinforced the
conviction of the drafters that “the cluster of rights spelled out in
articles . . . 19, 20, and 21 of the UDHR [freedom of opinion and
expression, of association, and participation in government] are
universally the first rights dictators will seek to deny and destroy.” 25

they guaranteed freedom of speech, the right of assembly, the right of association, and security
of property.
20. FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 15 (1939).
21. See DAVID LITTLE, Terrorism, Public Emergency, and International Order: The US
Example, 2001–2014, in ESSAYS IN RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO STAND ON 281
(2015), for an account of the consequences of Hitler’s appeal to the emergency clause of the Weimar
Constitution for the development of international human rights and humanitarian law.
22. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4
(Dec. 16, 1966).
23. Id.
24. Johannes Morsink, World War II as Catalyst, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 36–91 (1999).
25. Id. at 69.
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Also, the “atrocity crimes” enshrined in the Statute of Rome26—
namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and
aggression—are further examples of arbitrary force that were seared
into public memory during the middle of the twentieth century. 27 In
addition, disregarding or deliberately depriving people of the human
rights of survival embodied in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 28—adequate
sustenance, health, education, and cultural opportunity—would
amount to “arbitrary neglect,” a close relative of arbitrary force and
something also indelibly exhibited during the “Hitler time.” 29
It is of the greatest importance that Article 18 of the UDHR and
ICCPR—the right to freedom of conscience, religion, or belief—is
included among the list of nonderogable rights. That is because a key
feature of arbitrary force as practiced by the Hitler regime was the
relentless imposition by force of a specific set of beliefs on everyone
under its control, meaning the persecution of all religious (and other)
expressions of dissent. Such actions were arbitrary because coercion is
not a justification for believing the truth or rightness of anything.
Since, at bottom, conscience, religion, and belief involve convictions
about truth and rightness, they are subject, in traditional language, to
the “law of the spirit”—persuasive appeals to reason, emotion, and
evidence—and not to the “law of the sword.”
This rationale underlies Article 18, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR,
which states that “no one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair [one’s] freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
[one’s] choice.” 30 According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
authorized to exposit the terms of the ICCPR, Article 18 “protects
theistic, nontheistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to
profess any religion or belief.” 31 Moreover, Article 18 distinguishes
26. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544 (amended 2010).
27. David Scheffer has usefully introduced the terms “atrocity crime” and its relation,
“atrocity law.” See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 428–40 (2012).
28. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 22.
29. See LITTLE, supra note 9, at 3–4 (2015) (discussing “arbitrary neglect”).
30. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 22, at art. 18, ¶ 2.
31. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., GENERAL COMMENT NO. 22 (1993), reprinted in
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 92 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin
eds., 1998).
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between belief and manifestation, such that holding or avowing a
conviction may in no way be limited, while manifesting or acting it
out is subject only to such limitations as are “prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 32 Finally, the Committee
emphasizes that Article 18 “is not limited in its application to
traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional
characteristics.” 33 It rules out “any tendency to discriminate against
any religion or belief for any reasons, including the fact that they are
newly established or represent religious minorities.” 34
There is strong empirical support for the proposition that human
rights compliance in general, and religious freedom compliance in
particular, expand the prospects for peace. As to human rights in
general, Todd Landman, the author of a careful comparative study
concludes that “it appears that greater democracy and
interdependence are associated empirically with a reduction of human
rights violations and a reduction of inter-state conflict.” 35 He
emphasizes that “it is liberal democracy . . . that is essential for rights
protection, where horizontal and vertical accountability are enshrined
in constitutionalism and the rule of law, [and, therefore,] where rights
abuses cannot take place with impunity.” 36
In a more recent study, Human Rights and Democracy: Precarious
Triumph of Ideals, Todd Landman continues to stand behind these
conclusions, declaring that a strong combination of human rights and
democracy significantly reduces lethal repression by elevating political
participation and accountability, among other benefits. 37 At the same
time, he admits that the capacity of democracies to uphold human
rights and maintain peace, both inside and outside their borders, is
sorely tested these days by the threat of terrorism. 38

32. Id. at 93.
33. Id. at 92.
34. Id.
35. TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
170 (2005).
36. Id. at 169.
37. TODD LANDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE PRECARIOUS TRIUMPH
OF IDEALS (2013).
38. Id.
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By emphasizing the interconnection of human rights, democracy,
and peace, Landman invokes something known in political science
circles as the “Liberal Peace.” The idea of the Liberal Peace holds that
the orderly and properly sequenced development of robust liberal
political and economic institutions, including “a whole panoply of
institutions to ensure the rule of law and [equal] rights,” is a critical
condition of national and international peace, while illiberal or
ethnically exclusivist institutions increase the probability of violence of
either an institutionalized sort, as in autocratic systems, or outside
institutional control, as in insurgencies and civil wars. 39
The most important claim of the Liberal Peace, based on a
systematic investigation of thousands of paired or dyadic relationships
between countries, is that developed democracies, especially those
with a high degree of inter-state commerce and membership in
international organizations, do not fight each other. 40 Please note, it
does not say that developed democracies refrain from fighting
nondemocracies. The whole history of colonialism together with the
experience of the Cold War and the more current pattern of armed
conflict between Western democracies and militant extremists
disproves that. 41
Rather, the more limited claim—of special interest to us, given
that reaction to Hitler’s autocratic rule was the inspiration for human
rights—is that “[p]airs of democracies are much more peaceful than
either pairs of autocracies or mixed democratic-autocratic pairs.”42
“Nothing comparable to the effect of democratic norms and
institutions produces a generalized pattern of dispute-avoidance
among authoritarian states,” according to the authors of a well-known

39. JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST
CONFLICT 316–17 (2000).
40. See BRUCE RUSSETT & JOHN R. ONEAL, TRIANGULATING PEACE: DEMOCRACY,
INTERDEPENDENCE,
AND
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
193–96
(2001)
(summarizing findings).
41. Armed responses during the nineteenth and twentieth century by the British in India
or the French in Algeria are examples from the colonial period. A Cold War example is the armed
intervention led by the United States against communist forces in Indochina in the 1960s and
70s. The use of force against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria by the United States in league
with the United Kingdom and France, among others, is a contemporary example of armed
conflict between democratic governments and militant extremists.
42. RUSSETT & ONEAL, supra note 40 at 115.
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study of the Liberal Peace. 43 In a recent collection of essays on the
subject, Michael Doyle emphasizes that the empirical case for the
Liberal Peace continues to be “exceptionally strong,” while admitting
that ongoing research is still required. 44 The evidence shows that
“democratic institutions” “promote peace and mutual respect among
democratic peoples,” “enhance human rights, produce higher levels
of political participation, [] decrease state repression,” “serve to
protect the mass of the population from state indifference during a
natural disaster,” and stimulate economic growth and inclusiveness.
Weak democratic institutions foster violence. 45
In regard to intra-state, as opposed to inter-state violence,
democracies do better in general, though “partial democracies
experience violent state failures more often than either full
democracies or autocracies do.” 46 This suggests that political
transitions are especially perilous, as confirmed by the fact that the
“vast majority of civil wars in the twentieth century occurred neither
in democracies nor in [autocratic] states able to repress
opposition vigorously.” 47
As to the connection between religious freedom and peace, there
is an important study by Brian Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of
Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century. 48 The authors indicate that eighty-three percent of countries
with more than two million people have constitutions promising
religious freedom and eight percent of countries without constitutions
have laws to the same effect, while only nine percent, or thirteen
43. Id.; see also R.J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF
NONVIOLENCE (2004); MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL, THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE: HOW
DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE (2005). For other examples of support for
the Liberal Peace, see generally TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT
RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY (2000); TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC
CONFLICT IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2nd ed. 2004); MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS,
MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS (2006); LARRY
DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCIETIES
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2008); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER
CIVIL CONFLICT (2004).
44. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, LIBERAL PEACE: SELECTED ESSAYS 216 (2012).
45. Id. at 202–03
46. RUSSETT & ONEAL, supra note 40, at 70.
47. Id.
48. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011).
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countries, offer no such promises. 49 Nevertheless, the study reveals
some disturbing results on the part of governments around the world
in regard to living up to the promises made, and the effects of that
failure on the incidence of violent conflict. The central conclusion is
this: “[V]iolent religious persecution and conflict rise as government
and social restrictions on religion increase.” 50 The reverse is also true:
“[W]e have demonstrated the pacifying consequences of religious
freedoms. We have found that when social and government
restrictions on religion are reduced, violent religious persecution
is reduced.” 51
Incidentally, the authors emphasize that the record of compliance
with religious freedom standards is deeply intertwined with the record
of compliance with other human rights indicating that violation of
religious freedom is strongly correlated with the violation of rights to
freedom of speech and assembly. 52 Religious freedoms, the authors
state, “are embedded in a much larger bundle of civil liberties.” 53 This

49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 212.
51. Id. at 210. Some critics hold that the understanding of religion, and therefore
religious freedom, in Grim and Finke’s book is too narrow for being confined by a consumer’s
model of religion. On that model, “[B]elieving is taken as the defining characteristic of what it
means to be religious, and the right to believe (or not) [sic] as the essence of what it means to
be free.” HURD, supra note 4, at 51. It is true their understanding is in some ways too narrow.
Their “religious economies” approach, holding that deregulated religion is beneficial in the same
way as a deregulated market, relies on three Enlightenment figures, Voltaire, David Hume, and
Adam Smith who are, perhaps, not the most unbiased students of religion. GRIM & FINKE, supra
note 48, at 2–6. Grim and Finke take them to believe that every religion characteristically seeks
to dominate by repressing competitors, and the best way to prevent that is to increase the
number of competitors, making it hard for any one religion to gain a monopoly. Id. at 3–6. On
their account, to believe in the superiority of one’s religion is necessarily to regard competitors
as “dangerous and wrong” and to warrant repression, as exemplified, they think, by the New
England Puritans. Id. at 46, 58. Such a claim, of course, disregards radical English and American
Puritans, not to mention Anabaptists, who helped constitute the “free church” tradition in
Western Christianity. See FRANKLIN HAMLIN LITTELL, THE FREE CHURCH (1957). Members
of that tradition regularly believed in the superiority of their religion, and simultaneously favored,
often at great cost, the universal protection of the freedom of conscience. GRIM & FINKE, supra
note 48, at 48–59, 66–68. Moreover, Grim and Finke’s approach does run the risk of ignoring
violations of the rights of less conventional religious and cultural groups (see below for an
assessment of charges to that effect). Nevertheless, they have, by any reckoning, identified
significant and widespread forms of repression and persecution that must be taken into account.
52. GRIM & FINKE, supra note 48, at 205.
53. Id.
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conclusion ties the consideration of religious freedom back to the
broader conclusions about human rights, democracy, and peace.
III. CRITIQUES OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND PEACE
There are, as we mentioned, strong objections to this picture of
the positive connections among human rights, religious freedom, and
peace. Talal Asad, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the
City University of New York, has attracted a devoted following for
calling sharply into question the contribution of human rights and
humanitarian law to peace. Though he is not entirely consistent on
the matter, he frequently asserts that human rights language does not
constitute, as alleged, a transnational system of accountability able to
restrain arbitrary force within and among states. 54 On the contrary, it
amounts to little more than a set of biased legal instruments whose
function is to serve the hegemonic interests of modern nation-states. 55
Asad at times calls human rights “floating signifiers that can be
attached to or detached from various subjects and classes constituted
by the market principle and designated by the most powerful nationstates.” 56 His predominant example is the United States. It speaks a
“secular language of [world] redemption,” which, for all its
particularity, now works as a force in the field of foreign relations to
globalize human rights. 57 For that language does, after all, draw on
the idea that “freedom” and “America” are virtually
interchangeable—that American political culture is (as the Bible says
of the Chosen People) “a light unto the nations.” Hence,
“democracy,” “human rights,” and “being free” are integral to the
universalizing moral project of the American nation-state—the project
of humanizing the world—and an important part of the way very
many Americans see themselves in contrast to their “evil” opponents.58

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

1224
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Id. at 147.
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The animating idea is the “centralizing state” 59 which rests “on
coercion,” or what Asad calls, “the exercise of violence.” 60 The state
comes to act as the ultimate, exclusive, and all-determining authority,
not only over politics and economic affairs, but also over the place and
character of morality and religion. 61 As he puts it, “the nation-state is
not a generous agent and its law does not deal in persuasion.” 62 In
reality, the notion of “universalizing reason”—the “myth of
liberalism,” which lies at the heart the Euro-American Enlightenment
project—actually “go[es] against the grain of human and social
nature,” and, consequently, must be imposed and maintained
violently. 63 Asad’s image is of a garden constantly threatened by a
surrounding jungle held back only by policies of perpetual violence
and destruction. 64 “[T]o make an enlightened space, the liberal must
continually attack the darkness of the outside world that threatens to
overwhelm that space.” 65
These conclusions lead Asad to claim that far from restraining
torture or other forms of “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment”
as human rights language is supposed to require, 66 “many liberaldemocratic governments” actually depend on these methods “to

59. Id. at 227.
60. Id. at 256.
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 59.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 116. Asad contends that the modern state takes it upon itself to be the sole
arbiter of what counts as acceptable pain and suffering. Id. at 117. Accordingly, it is mandated
that pain and suffering should not be “excessive” or “gratuitous,” but “proportional” to the
ends sought, suggesting that pain and suffering are quantifiable in reference to whatever is taken
to be a “military necessity.” Id. The problem, Asad argues, is that “proportional” means
whatever the state says, and the idea of “military necessity” can be extended indefinitely. Id. at
117–18. “Any measure . . . no matter how much suffering it creates, may be justified . . . .” Id.
His claim that the idea of “military necessity” has no meaning apart from what modern states
arbitrarily ascribe to it is not correct. Military necessity is clearly limited by Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, and, more specifically, by Geneva Convention IV, articles 33 and
34, prohibiting collective punishment and reprisals, though a thorough discussion of the subject
calls for a much more extensive treatment. The idea that the quantifiability of pain, as implied in
the concept of “proportionality,” is a modern idea is flatly wrong. See, e.g., MAGNA CARTA art.
20 (1215) (“A free-man shall not be amerced [fined] for a trivial offence but only according to
the degree of the offence; and for a great delinquency, according to the magnitude of
the delinquency . . . .”).
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control populations of noncitizens,” 67 as the U.S. did in Vietnam;
Israel in Gaza and the West Bank; and Britain in Aden, Cyprus, and
Northern Ireland—all in recent memory. 68 That practice is in line with
long-established Western colonial policies that colonialists saw as
essential to inculcating civilization. 69 Having publicly denounced such
methods and solemnly ratified international instruments outlawing
them, modern states typically try to hide their violations, but the
violations are nevertheless “understood [by them] as a means [to be]
used strategically for the maintenance of the nation-state’s interests.” 70
Such practices are required, presumably, by the ongoing need to “hold
back the jungle” 71 by means of “the exercise of violence.” 72
There is, to be sure, some truth in Asad’s account. Modern liberaldemocratic states do frequently and sometimes extensively violate
human-rights norms, and those violations undoubtedly contribute to
instability and occasionally to violence. Also, it has already been
admitted that democratic states, however peaceful they may be in
relation to each other, are not often so peaceful in dealing with
nondemocratic states, nor, by any means, are their reasons for using
force in such instances always justified. But even if they engage in such
practices intentionally, trying to cover them up disguises their adverse
effects on peace and presupposes the recognized legitimacy of the
standards and their connection to peace. Indeed, the fact that states
try to disguise their behavior is itself an example of vice paying tribute
to virtue.
Asad’s larger claim that human rights language as such represents
a threat to peace is very serious. The main problem with the claim is
that, on inspection, it is rather elusive. Above all, what we need from
Asad is a clearer indication of where he stands on the behavior that is
now prohibited by human rights and humanitarian law standards. He
was asked once in an interview why there were reports of more human

67. ASAD, supra note 10, at 114–15.
68. Id. at 114 n.19.
69. Id. at 110–11.
70. Id. at 114–15.
71. See id. at 59–60.
72. Id. at 256 (applying discussion of liberalism as a jungle that is continually
encroaching); see id. at 59–60.
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rights violations in the third-world than in Western democracies. 73 He
responded that “there are quite a lot of dictators in power” in Latin
America, Africa, and China, as well as the Muslim world. 74 His
response apparently accepted the premise that autocracies violate
established human rights standards more than liberal democracies do,
and, by implication, that that is not a good thing. However, he
returned to form in the same interview, stating that “many of the
assumptions underlying rights” are biased against practices seen not
to be sufficiently Western or are the result of discriminatory
Western policies. 75
It is essential that Asad distinguish between the human rights
standards he affirms and those that he does not. And he must identify
when the problem lies with the standards and when it lies in the
violation of those standards. Until he does that, it is impossible to tell
whether the alleged bias involved is in the standards themselves or in
the application and interpretation of the standards. Asad is ready to
call third-world dictators to account for human rights violations. But
that readiness raises serious questions about his picture of the liberal
democratic state as the major source of repression and violence in
the world.
If, on the other hand, he means to reject most or all existing
standards as nothing more than “floating signifiers” 76 of the
hegemonic interests of modern democracies, then he must tell us what
he makes of the Nazi record of treatment both of German citizens and
captured peoples. Does he object to that record? And, if so, what does
he recommend as a way to prevent a recurrence? Are any of the human
rights and humanitarian standards of use in helping prevent modern
states from acting like the Nazi state? If so, which ones? If not, what
shall replace the standards, and what is the connection between his
substitute measures and peace? Until we have answers to these
questions, Asad’s challenge to the Liberal Peace remains unproven.

73. Interview by Nermeen Shaikh with Talal Asad, Professor of Anthropology, City Univ.
of N.Y., ASIA SOC’Y, http://asiasociety.org/islam-secularism-and-modern-state (last visited
Oct. 3, 2016) [hereinafter ASIA SOC’Y].
74. ASIA SOC’Y, supra note 73.
75. ASIA SOC’Y, supra note 73.
76. ASAD, supra note 10, at 158.
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Next, we take up the criticisms registered by Oliver Richmond in
his volume, A Post-Liberal Peace. 77 Richmond’s special focus is on the
peacebuilding consequences that he thinks have followed from efforts
to implement the conventional understanding of the Liberal Peace.
He reviews a number of cases of internationally sponsored postconflict reconstruction, like Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
and Timor Leste, and concludes that the going version of the Liberal
Peace, which has guided these endeavors, has in large part failed to
create conditions for a durable and just peace. 78 In the name of
fostering “liberal institutions” (constitutionalism, human rights, etc.)
that are supposed to generate peace domestically and internationally,
the effects, rather, have been to strengthen political and economic
elites both inside and outside government at the expense of common
people at the “everyday” local level. 79 The special culprit, according to
Richmond, is neoliberal economic policies that entrench extensive
inequalities in wealth and opportunity, though he mentions other
factors as well. 80
I do not dispute Richmond’s findings, particularly in light of the
experience of developed democracies like the United States with
growing social and economic inequality associated with the market
economy and the potential for deep frustration and serious conflict
that appear to accompany it. I simply observe that when all is said and
done, Richmond does not forsake the Liberal Peace, but calls instead
for it to live up to the full range of its assumptions. He does this by
calling for efforts to expand the reach of civil and political rights to
apply equally to all citizens, in the spirit of authentic democracy, and,
interestingly, to make available to all the human rights necessary for
survival—adequate sustenance, health, education, and cultural
opportunity—embodied in the ICESCR. 81
It must be admitted that such a policy contradicts some influential
interpretations of the market economy and thereby modifies

77. See RICHMOND, supra note 11.
78. Id. at 66–91.
79. See id. at 186–90 for a summary of conclusions.
80. Id. at 36.
81. RICHMOND, supra note 11, at 25–43 (calling explicit attention to the rights to
survival codified in the ICESCR).

1228

LITTLE_FINAL MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1215

11/1/16 8:54 AM

Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Peace

significantly one widespread reading of the Liberal Peace. 82 At the
same time, such a proposal is ultimately consistent with the full range
of human rights—civil and political, and economic, social, and
cultural—that are inscribed in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. If the
Liberal Peace is taken, as it should be, to mean implementing all, and
not just some, human rights, then Richmond is in accord, after all,
with one—arguably compelling—version of the Liberal Peace.
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and Winnifred Sullivan, authors,
respectively, of Beyond Religious Freedom and The Impossibility of
Religious Freedom, 83 go further than Richmond, and align much more
closely with Asad’s predominant claim against the idea of Liberal
Peace. They assert that human rights language in general and religious
freedom language in particular is in reality the language of political
domination. Sullivan doubts it is possible to find any transnational
basis above and beyond the “legal regimes” of the nation-state,
presumably such as international law, that could escape the “political
manipulation” to which such regimes are unavoidably subject. 84
Human rights guarantees, including religious freedom guarantees, are
“undermined by the limitations of language” as well as by “the statist
monopoly of law common in the modern nations of the West.” 85
Elizabeth Hurd sharpens this point: As with human rights
language generally, formally employing the vocabulary of religious
freedom authorizes biased understandings “of what it means to be
religious, and what it means for religion to be free.” 86 Such an
approach risks “exacerbating the social tensions, forms of
discrimination, and intercommunal discord that [human rights
language claims] to transcend.” 87
The underlying argument is that all universalistic language, such
as that found in the human rights code, is mistaken, and not
recognizing this leads to serious abuse and victimization. In regard to
religious freedom, for example, there is no one thing called “religion”
that applies all over the world. People in different cultures have very

82. A view extensively discussed and criticized in Jackie Smith, Economic Globalization
and Strategic Peacebuilding, in STRATEGIES OF PEACE: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT IN A
VIOLENT WORLD 247–69 (Daniel Philpot & Gerard F. Powers eds., 2010).
83. See HURD, supra note 4; SULLIVAN, supra note 6.
84. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 157.
85. Id. at 156–58.
86. HURD, supra note 4, at 61–64.
87. Id.
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different understandings of the term. Therefore, what qualifies as
“religious freedom” is bound to vary accordingly. The upshot is that
proponents of a universal human right to religious freedom wind up
coercively and arbitrarily imposing their own ideas and biases on
others who have very different notions. The undertaking is an exercise
in oppression and discrimination. And, as such, it causes
“intercommunal discord” and, likely increases violence. The particular
culprits are national governments, who in the name of advancing
“freedom, justice, and peace in the world,” actually advance their own
parochial ideas and interests, which makes for conflict, not peace. This
approach is a direct and systematic assault on the idea of the Liberal
Peace, even the revised view of it suggested in the discussion of Oliver
Richmond above. 88
There are several problems with the approach. First, it fails to
prove that the violations identified by Grim and Finke 89 do not occur,
and do not have the violent consequences they report. Nor do the
proponents of this approach prove that the violations they describe
amount to anything like the extent of oppression and violence Grim
and Finke report.
Second, the authors do not succeed in divorcing themselves
completely from something like a human rights approach to religious
freedom. For example, Elizabeth Hurd says there is no such thing as
“religion” as such, and then proceeds to argue that something called
“lived religion” 90—a fluid, loosely organized, nondoctrinaire
experience “as practiced by everyday individuals and groups” 91—is
regularly subverted around the world by what she calls “governed
religion” 92—the religion sponsored and imposed by the state—and by
“expert religion” 93—an understanding of religion invented by scholars
and lawyers and forced upon people against their wishes. In effect,
Hurd has simply substituted her own alternative definition of religion,
together with an ambitious theory of religious freedom that is based
on her account of how religion is supposed to be repressed around
the world.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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The emphasis on “lived religion” is meant to show that the ideas
enshrined in the human rights code are biased in favor of a Western
(and especially American) notion of what religion “really” is. All the
talk of “conscience” and “belief” in the code bears the stamp of
“hyperprotestantism,” something that favors a voluntaristic, highly
rationalized, tightly organized form of religion that ignores or plays
down ritual and ceremony as well as the kind of flexible, unreflective
religious experience that is so much a part of the “everyday” lives of
people around the world. 94
However, Sullivan and Hurd do not avoid using human rights
concepts altogether. At one point, Sullivan states that “[t]o be
religious is, in some sense, to be obedient to a rule outside oneself and
one’s government, whether that rule is understood to be established
by God, or otherwise. It is to do what must be done.” 95 This is, in fact,
a conventional description of freedom of conscience—a rule outside
oneself and one’s government to which one is ultimately loyal. 96 In her
view, a religiously informed conscience, or something like it, stands
above and beyond the coercive power of the state, which is exactly the
message of Article 18, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR. 97
My guess is that whenever fundamental commitments—whether
religious or not, and whether in the form of “lived religion” or not—
come in conflict with the state, they quickly crystallize into what we
would recognize as conscientious beliefs. It does not matter whether
they are principles or doctrines or rituals or cherished practices lived
out in “everyday life,” committed persons in face of persecution are
forced to give reasons—to express beliefs—as to why their commitments
are of paramount importance to them, and why those commitments
94. Id. at 56–57.
95. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 156 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. Sullivan and her Immanent Frame colleagues frequently criticize defenders of the
right of religious freedom for holding that the convictions of conscience are the result of a
process of voluntary selection, close to the idea of “consumer choice,” rather than the experience
of “being claimed” by some binding religious or moral mandate “to do what must be done.” Id.
at 7–8, 156; HURD, supra note 4, at 51. But this is to confuse things. On a traditional Christian
understanding of conscience, “[t]o be religious is not to be free, but to be faithful,” as Sullivan
puts it, is true in regard to conscience, and not in regard to the state. SULLIVAN, supra note 6,
at 156. Because one is bound by conscience, one claims the right to freedom of choice so far as
the state goes. See Paul W. Taylor, Religion and Freedom of Choice, in RELIGION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, 170–87 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012), for a thoughtful discussion
of the subject in respect to the jurisdiction of the state.
97. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 22, art. 18.
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should be tolerated and not suppressed. It is this very predicament of
conscience versus state that Grim and Finke report on in such distressing
and extensive detail, and it is by no means clear how the practitioners
of lived religion escape that predicament when confronted with state
repression. In fact, Hurd repeatedly calls attention to the way
“governed religion” and “expert religion” harm groups by
disregarding what they believe about themselves! 98
Hurd invokes the example of what she thinks are abuses inflicted
on the Alevis of Turkey by defining them officially as a homogenous
“religious minority” in a way that seriously misrepresents the
understanding of Alevism of some members. 99 Classifying Alevism in
accord with the categories imposed by “governed” and “expert
religion” “sanctifies particular understandings of Alevism as orthodox
while marginalizing others.” 100 “Dissenters and those making claims
on behalf of Alevism deemed unorthodox or threatening by ‘leading
Alevi men of faith’ are disenfranchised.” 101 According to Hurd, this is
done in part by ignoring the fact that some of the convictions in
question are not thought of as “religious” at all. 102
It is hard to see this description (if accurate) as anything other than
a case of unwarranted government (and “expert”) interference with
the conscientious beliefs of some Alevis—those “making claims on
behalf of Alevism deemed unorthodox . . . .” For one thing, the idea of
“lived religion” as something indifferent to belief seems to have been
forgotten. For another, the critical question, on a human rights
understanding, is not whether the beliefs in question are “religious”
or not, but whether they are “conscientious”—that is, whether they
are of paramount importance and considered worth defending at
substantial cost. If they are, governments (and experts) are bound to
find ways to respect those beliefs, subject to specified limitations. That
is the meaning of “religion or belief.”
The same applies to another example Hurd gives. She complains
that “the logic of religious rights renders politically invisible less
established religions, collective ways of life, and modes of being and

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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belonging that do not qualify as “religious.” Nontraditional religions,
unprotected religions, and nonreligions are pushed into the wings.”103
She illustrates the point by referring to the perceived mistreatment of
the K’iche’, a “Maya ethnic group” living in the western highlands of
Guatemala. 104 The K’iche’ people strongly objected for “religious and
cultural reasons” to mining operations undertaken on their land by
multinational corporations backed by the state. 105 Their objections
were ignored because devotion to the land was not regarded by the
authorities as “legally . . . religious” according to the standards of
“governed and expert” religion. 106 “When [the case is] cast in terms
of religion understood as the right to believe or not, violations of the
K’iche’ religio-cultural heritage fall below the threshold of [what is
politically or judicially ajudicable].” 107
But such a judgment by officials seems, on its face, to be blatantly
inconsistent with existing human rights law and jurisprudence. Since
“religious and cultural reasons” were explicitly given in defense of
their objections, the issue is not whether an artificial standard of belief
is being imposed on the K’iche’ people; they are clearly citing beliefs
in defense of their position. In addition, we have seen that protected
beliefs need not be religious, but only conscientious, and that
“nontraditional religions, unprotected religions, and [conscientious]
nonreligions” are explicitly covered by human rights jurisprudence. 108
Finally, Article 27 of the ICCPR (which Guatemala ratified in 2000)
guarantees that persons belonging to “ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities” “shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.” 109
Hurd and Sullivan do succeed in providing some egregious
examples of the international religious freedom campaign gone wrong
by discriminating against practitioners of lived religion. But what the
authors do not prove, despite their protests to the contrary, is that the
vocabulary of religious freedom is incapable of resolving these
troubling examples fairly. The language and categories of religious
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. (alterations in original).
GENERAL COMMENT NO. 22, supra note 31.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 22, art. 27 (emphasis added).
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freedom, as elaborated in the commentary of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee above, are quite capacious, and are able to supply remedies
for the kind of oversight and mistaken judgment by governments and
experts that Sullivan and Hurd identify. The fact that the standards are
not always scrupulously applied reflects negatively, to be sure, on the
officials in question, but not on the standards themselves.
I close by illustrating my point about the capacity of persons
charged with upholding religious freedom standards for sensitivity and
broadmindedness, remembering that such persons are typically
associated in Hurd’s mind with the prejudices of “governed religion”
and “expert religion.” I am referring to a memorable dissent by Justice
Brennan in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, a 1988
U.S. Supreme Court decision overruling a lower court judgment that
the U.S. Forest Service had violated Navajo religious rights by
constructing a road across a mountain sacred to the Navajo.
In supporting Navajo rights that he believed the majority opinion
had disregarded, Justice Brennan wrote as follows:
[F]or Native Americans religion is not a discrete sphere of activity
separate from all others, and any attempt to isolate the religious
aspects of Indian life “is in reality an exercise which forces Indian
concepts into non-Indian categories.
...
In marked contrast to traditional Western religions, the belief
systems of Native Americans do not rely on doctrines, creeds, or
dogmas. Established universal truths—the mainstay of Western
religions—play no part in Indian faith. Ceremonies are communal
efforts undertaken for specific purposes in accordance with
instructions handed down from generation to generation . . . .
Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native American
faith is inextricably bound to the use of land. 110

Justice Brennan’s opinion should surely have prevailed, but
whether it did or not, his opinion proves that prominent judicial
officials charged with upholding religious freedom standards are in
fact profoundly capable of appreciating the special perspective and
distinctive interests of indigenous peoples.

110. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 459–61 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is a close connection between human rights, religious
freedom, and peace. So far, at least, the sustained and apparently
growing drumbeat of opposition against the connection has not
succeeded. Too often, as critics assert, human rights and religious
freedom standards are not properly applied. This causes serious injury
and no doubt jeopardizes the prospects for justice and peace where
such mistakes occur. But the fault is with those interpreting and
applying the standards, not with the standards themselves.
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